

The Statist Tradition and the Influence of Liberalism on the Development of the Turkish State Until the 1980s.

Ahmet HELVACI*

Though the legitimacy of the state is universally accepted, its efficiency and influence are a matter of debate in some political systems such as Turkey. The belief and practice that the state can do whatever it wants creates the real constraints on civil societal power. In this situation government not only extends its scope into new areas of social and economic policy, but it also needs the support of legal norms and civic values in order to secure the implementation of policy.

This article intends to reflect on processes of change in Turkish society and politics in terms of statism and liberal characteristics of Turkish modernisation. The other major concern of this study is to highlight the impact of the modernisation process as well as objective stages of a creation of the 'nation state'.

The first section of this article aims to give an account of statism in Turkish history, while the second section will focus on the

liberal trend in the Turkish modernisation process. At the same time, it is hoped that these accounts show an awareness of the limits and difficulties of introducing liberal policies on the Turkish political agenda.

The second section will comprise two main parts. The main objective of this section is to provide an overview of the neo-liberal tendency in Turkish politics until the 1980s. This section will try to explore the historical background of liberal political and economic policies, including during the Ottoman Empire. This article does not include the experience of the 1980s and the post Ozal period, because they should be examined in a separate study due to its magnitude and importance. In the conclusion, these findings will be drawn together and will be directed to characteristics of problems facing Turkey today and in the future.

One of the main sources of statism in Turkish politics lies in the Turkish political culture. Turkish culture 'assigns an important and perhaps mystic role to the state as the

* Dr., Kırıkkale Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi

saviour, and the embodiment, of Turkish society' (Erguder 1987: 11). Turkey has an authoritarian political culture which is intolerant towards opposition, sees power as ab-

solute and recognises the state's absolute right to legislate on public matters (Heper 1985:17). There are many features which characterise Turkish political culture. The most important one is that the dominance of status-based values rather than market-originated ones.

Atilla Yayla¹ (Interview, 27 May 1996) suggested that Turkish political culture has the following attributes:

(1) Turks attribute primacy to the collectivity, not to the individual. For both the Right and Left, collectivist tendencies have dominated. The human being is not valued as an individual, and citizens get their values from their classes, societies etc.

(2) Turks have an inclination to obey authority, as he put "though it is not as much as the Germans do". On the other hand, Tanyol claims that, neither the Turkish state tradition, nor the Turkish people are accustomed to the idea of the Army out of Turkish politics (Tanyol 1990: 192).

(3) The Turkish political system has depended on illicit gains. In this respect Turkey has a degenerate democracy. Politicians act in their narrowly defined self-interest. By manipulating the public institutions everyone tries to get benefits which they really do not deserve.

(4) Everyone has a misconception of national wealth. They think that Turkey is wealthy enough for the people to obtain whatever they demand. They think that production and distribution are different functions and unrelated. Thus, they assume that Turkey would distribute the same amount of resources even if it does not produce anything.

(5) Ideological handicaps are present in all the political communities. Ideology is characterised by paternalism, lack of trust and collectivism. In Turkey it is even possible to encounter "civil totalitarianism".

Therefore, in the first section, the aim is to reveal under which conditions statism emerged and developed, and which factors contributed to the determination of the political and economic statism, under both the Ottoman state and the Turkish republic. Chronologically, the first section will be divided into two parts: the Ottoman Empire period and the republican period.

The Statist Tradition

'Sacred State, Servant People': The Ottoman Era (1299 - 1922)

The Ottoman rulers from the very beginning set forth to establish a centralised polity (Heper 1980: 82.) and the state was in the supreme position in the Ottoman polity. The state sought the strict loyalty of the subjects. Everyone, even its ruling group was the servant of the state rather than of the Sultans. Even "the Sultan was the capstone of the machinery of the state" (Mardin 1988: 29). The state was considered as the provider of *nizam* (order), and became too large to be dominated by one ruling group.

The military played a crucial role in the establishment of the Ottoman state. "They emerged as a major frontier principality defending and extending the realm of Islam against the Christian Byzantine Empire" (Heper 1985: 21). The identity of the Ottoman state and its army was intertwined (Hale 1994: 2). At the beginning, the basic function of the Ottoman administration was that of achieving military co-operation and success. Although the King of France could only govern with the acquiescence of an aristocracy, the Ottoman Sultan had to rely on his army (Hale 1994: 3).

Islam, especially its *Hanefi* interpretation², also helped the consecration of the state. According to this interpretation, the individual and the society have to obey the state, especially the order (*nizam*) of the state and the *Umma*³ are concerned. In the Ottoman view, the Sultan (the ruler) was appointed by God to hold the 'estates' of society (Heper 1985: 26); and he was 'the shadow of Allah in the universe' (*zillullahi fil alem*).

In the text quoted by Turan, Serif Mardin states that "in many Islamic countries, the head of the state has been seen as some sort of a Pharaoh. In the case of the Ottomans, however, owing to the existence of certain traditions which have their origins in Central Asia, the *Umma* is loyal to the state; and does not resist the authority of the state." (Turan 1991: 54.)

There has been ongoing discussion about whether the Ottoman Empire was statist or religious, and which one was subordinated to which. It is agreed that there was a two-way relationship between religion and politics. As it is stated: "The Ottoman bureaucrat saw as his duty the preservation of integrity of the state and the promotion of Islam. This was expressed in the formula '*din-u devlet*' or 'religion and state'. But it was also understood that the viability of the state was essential for the preservation of religion. In the sense that the state was necessary to keep religion flourishing, it had priority over religion" (Turan 1991: 41).

On the other hand, the Ottomans kept the earlier Turkic-Iranian state tradition that if the public interest required it, the ruler could take some measures that would conflict with the sacred law (Heper, 1985, 24). Therefore, Islam acted as one medium of solidifying power at the very top. Islam did not determine every aspect of life, but was a mediating force that created categories transcending ethnicity (Reynolds 1996: 21)

The Ottoman land system is very important for understanding statist characteristics of the Ottoman Empire. Both the establishment and the corruption of the land system helped the state to strengthen itself. In the classical institutional structure of the Ottomans there were a large number of independent peasants who possessed more or less similar amounts of land. They also paid a proportional tax to appointed functionaries. These functionaries were usually military, sometimes civic leaders and "their crucial characteristic was that they derived their status not from inheritance or local influence but from having been appointed by the central authority" (Keyder 1987: 12). When the Ottoman administration was first established in Anatolia, all agricultural land passed to the ownership of the state. All local feudal rights were abolished (Heper 1985: 22).

Thus, under the Ottoman fief system, each fief-holder was given only a relatively small parcel of land (*ciftlik*), for his personal use. When he was assigned to another area, he returned this land to the state. He had only supervisory powers over other lands. He had to see to it that the peasants kept their assigned lands under cultivation, and paid their taxes. Administrative and legal matters were largely the responsibility of other centrally appointed governors, district judges (*Kadis*), and the janissary units.

The Ottoman centralisation effort was completed after the conquest of Istanbul in 1453. During the classical period, from the establishment (1299) up to the second part of the sixteenth century, 'the Ottoman state freed itself from the influence of the old Ottoman aristocracy' (Heper 1985: 28), and the sultanate was the locus of state power.

During the second period of the Ottoman Empire, from the second part of the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century, though the sultans were the head of the Empire, they

‘became puppets in the hands of military, civil, and/or religious bureaucracies, and/or various cliques in the palace itself’, and ‘it became difficult to see an identity between the sultan and the state’ (Heper, 1985, 35). At the end of the sixteenth century the civil bureaucracy already became the dominant figure in the polity.

The relations between the centre and periphery is the key to understanding the Ottoman statism at the second period. As noted above, after the classical period, the sultans lost their firm grip on the whole administrative system. Obviously, their position as the locus of the state was badly affected and the bureaucracy, as an institution and mechanism, became independent.

Much corruption emerged in the system of tax-farming: whenever a tax-farming right had to be leased, an agreement was reached between the potential tax farmers, ‘bankers’ (*sarraf*), and higher civil servants (pashas). “In order for those seeking a tax-farming position to participate effectively in the bidding at auction of the tax-farms, they were required to obtain the backing of a ‘banker’ who would stand as a surety for the tax-farmer, and the surety had to be endorsed by the treasury” (Heper 1985: 30). Whenever the treasury gave notice that it was going to allocate some of its revenues as a tax-farm, these ‘bankers’ would establish close ties with some pashas in order to secure the tax-farming contracts. The tax-farmers soon emerged as *ayan*, or a new stratum of local notables in the Ottoman polity.

As a consequence of this process the tax-paying peasants were put under the triple burden of providing the revenue needs of treasury, pay-offs for the higher bureaucrats and bankers, and the profits of the tax-farmers themselves. If those peasants had not been able to pay their taxes, they would have lost their lands and joined the former fief-

holders, who, now stripped of their earlier privileges, for the most part had turned into dissident armed groups, or the lords of the valleys (*derebeyis*). “Gradually, *derebeyis*, too, captured some of the tax-farming rights. In the process, the Sultan began losing his control over the free-floating resources” (Heper 1985: 31).

The Ottoman bureaucracy had to depend on *the Ayan* (local elites) of which it did not approve. They were powerful local mediators between the state and subjects (Hale, 1994, 10). Secondly it had to accept the influence of secondary groups in local reform committees and in the Ottoman Parliament. The essential reason for these two concessions was the failure of the Ottoman economy. In order to solve its financial problems, the ruling elite was urged to accept new forms of organisation which were against the Ottoman form of patrimonial rule.

The decline of the Ottoman Empire and its acceptance paved the way for the modernisation process of the *Tanzimat* (Regulations). The decline was not enough in itself but an acceptance of it was a necessary condition for the modernisation process. During the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1876), many measures were taken to stop the decay and the Ottoman state tried to catch up with the Western powers.

As the *Tanzimat* was also motivated by a policy of consolidating the centre itself, the centre intended to penetrate the periphery more effectively. “The equality of all ‘citizens’ proclaimed in both the *Gulhane Hatt-i Humayunu* (Imperial Prescript of *Gulhane*) of 1839 and the *Islahat Fermani* (Reform Edict) of 1856 was considered by the centre to be a practical means of mobilising the masses behind the state and against the local notables” (Heper 1985: 39). The centre utilised the Ottoman Parliament of 1877, the 1858 Land Code (reassertation of control over the state-owned land), and the

1864 *Vilayet* (Provinces) Law (increased the authority of the governors) as tools at its disposal for manipulating the periphery (Heper 1985: 40-1). Though, in the classical period the state was structured on the ruler, in the second period the state was structured on the bureaucracy.

Right after the *Tanzimat* there was another short period which was called 'the Young Turk period' in which "the stage was set for a new and in the long run, disastrous military involvement in politics" (Hale 1994: 32). It took place between 1876 and 1909. The military strengthened its position, the revolutionary movement arose within the army (Hale 1994: 31), and all the officials, including Ataturk, who would determine the new Republic's destiny, grew up during the Young Turk period⁴. This era had two important distinctions from the *Tanzimat* period: (a) the military became the main part of the state bureaucracy. The military started to be concerned about not only military affairs, but also civil affairs. (b) The motive of saving the state became the most dominant motive of the civil and military bureaucracy which have subsequently created problems for modern Turkey.

"State versus People": The Republican Era (1923 - 1980)

At the very end of the Ottoman empire the military bureaucracy, the army, and the civil bureaucracy were at the very core of Turkish politics, though the former has been more dominant due to the Young Turks period. The young Republic of Turkey could not, and did not, try to change this course, and the military and civil bureaucracy have been the main guarantors of statism in Turkey.

The centre's conception of the state and its attitude toward the periphery had hardly changed during the republican era by the 1980s. In the Republican operation the Western concept of the nation-state was accepted as a model for the new state. During

that time, 'existence of the state' and 'survival of the society' became the most important matter of the Turkish politics (Saribay 1994: 18).

Though Ataturk, the founder of Republican Turkey, did not consider the bureaucracy as the main formulator and the guardian of the interests of the Turkish community, he perceived the bureaucracy as an essential part of the leadership which was expected to carry Turkey towards 'contemporary civilisation'. It carried the Ottoman bureaucracy into the new republic and despite the introduction during the Republican period of the principle of delegation, the centre's sensitivity to local autonomy continued.

Ataturk introduced republicanism to Turkey as a substitution for personal rule. In this, the civil bureaucracy was a lesser part of the government. It was 'a mere instrument' (Heper 1985: 56). This is because Ataturk's impression of the civil service was formed during the Young Turk period which saw the civil service as an exploiter and useless. On the other hand, during the war of independence, most of the civil servants were indifferent to the national independence, and some of them actively undermined it (Heper 1985: 54). Ataturk also wanted civil servants to be servants of his reforms.

However, the republican revolution was realised by civil and military bureaucrats and consolidated by bureaucratic power with ministries at the centre and governors in the provinces and districts. The *Valis* and *Kaymakams*, because they are agencies of the government in their domains, were doing the job of installing the new regime. Since they are the chiefs of every important service like security, education and health, they were the key bureaucrats in enforcing central government policies. In the late 1930s, *Valis* were appointed chairmen of the local party organisations. On the other hand, some

military commanders in frontier regions were assigned as provincial governors as well (Hale 1994: 80). The governors were dominant in their provinces.

As Hale states, Ataturk's legacy was ambiguous in terms of the military in Turkish politics. On the one hand he forbade serving army officers to play any part in the legislature, on the other hand he encouraged them to think of themselves as the ultimate guardians of the republic (Hale 1988: 174). However, while Ataturk established the principle that the military in the Turkish Republic was to stay out of politics, he relied upon the military while he was realising his republican reforms (Altan 1994: 63). He also utilised former officers in important administrative posts. They were heavily represented in the Assembly and many also held important cabinet posts for long periods. As Hale put it, "Ataturk's revolution had left the Turkish army as the ultimate guardian of the republic, but effectively separated it from direct responsibility for government" (Hale 1994: 88).

After Ataturk's death in 1938 the bureaucratic elite became a substantial class and they acted as transformers of the Ataturkian ideas into a political manifesto. "Ataturkian thought was gradually transformed by the bureaucratic elite into an ideology" (Heper 1987: 135). They considered themselves as the guardians of the Republic, and acted in accordance with this self-appointed role. On the other hand, it is widely believed that the one party rule oppressed whole phases of Turkish society in terms of *laicism*⁵ and national integrity to consolidate its state centred authoritarianism. As Erdogan put it "(t)he RPP was not of the kind of party that one sees in Western constitutional and representative democracies, but rather an apparatus through which the population could be indoctrinated into Kemalist ideology, secularism being

most prominent in that outlook" (Erdogan 1999: 45).

During that time the military did not have any important problem with the Republican People's Party (RPP) and considered itself and President Inonu as the protectors of their republican tenets and the ultimate guardians of Ataturk's legacy. At that time they had honour and respect (Brown 1981: 388) while "all important decisions were taken or endorsed by Inonu himself" (Hale 1994: 82). Turkey had its first real free general elections in 1950.

The Democrat Party (DP) came to power with an important electoral victory on 14 May 1950 gaining 420 of the 487 seats in the National Assembly and Adnan Menderes who came from a large landowning family in Aydin became prime minister (Hale 1994: 90). The DP also won the 1954 and 1957 elections and stayed in power for a full ten years until the 27 May 1960 military coup.

Right after the first free elections in Turkey in 1950, the centre-periphery conflict came to the surface of the political and social agenda. Though the Republican People's Party was elitist, the Democrat Party placed rural interest above urban. It carried urban liberals, religious conservatives, the commercial middle classes (merchants) and the urban poor and modern sections of the rural population into politics (Ozbudun 1988: 17). Obviously the civil and military bureaucracy was discontented with this development.

Although the early years of the DP government did not provoke any serious conflict, during the second phase of the Democrat Party's dominance, the bureaucracy, especially the military, became discontented due to the harsh measures of the DP government. It considered this era to be a retreat from Ataturk's secularist and statist republic. As a consequence of harsh feeling and discontent, the first military coup of the

Republic of Turkey came about on 27 May 1960 “owing to the crisis into which Turkish democracy has fallen, and owing to the recent sad incidents and in order to prevent fratricide” (Hale 1994: 110). Moreover, Erdogan claimed that a retaliation was the main motivation behind the 1960 coup in order to return political power back to the pro-RPP state-elite (Erdogan 1999: 35-36).

The 1960 revolution is considered by some authors, as an attempt by the Kemalist centre to re-impose its hegemony (Heper, 1985, 13). Due to the fact that the Republicans relied on the urban bureaucratic elites, as many authors agreed, “the 1960 military intervention may be looked upon as the reaction of a front composed of the bureaucratic-intelligentsia against the Democrats supported by the periphery” (Erguder 1987: 20). The 1960 military coup had a historical meaning for the Turkish political system because it paved the way for military intervention in democracy in Turkey whenever the military considered Turkey’s security and integrity in danger.

The 1961 Constitution was prepared by the National Unity Committee (NUC) which was comprised of the officers who carried out the 1960 coup and who organised themselves into a Representative Assembly. The Representative Assembly, whose main duty was to prepare a new constitution, included the whole of the NUC, members chosen by Cemal Gursel, the chairman of the NUC, and the committee itself, provincial election committees, the bar, trades unions, other professional organisations and the two extant political parties (Hale 1994: 136).

Mustafa Erdogan called the era of the 1961 constitution as semi-liberal era. Regarding civil and political liberties and strengthened judicial review it was liberal, but it preserved the Kemalist ideological nature (Erdogan 1999: 36). The 1961 Constitution reflected the basic political

values and interests of these groups, and provided an effective system of checks and balances to limit the power of elected assemblies. On the other hand, as a legacy of the 1960s, because former officers Cemal Gursel and Cevdet Sunay became presidents in the 1960s in sequence, “the unfortunate idea was created among some officers that the Chief of the General Staff would automatically become president on the death or retirement of the incumbent” (Hale 1994: 173).

The 1961 constitution changed the perception of ‘national sovereignty. In the 1961 constitution, ‘the concept of unconditional people’s sovereignty’ of the 1921 and 1924 constitutions was changed to “the people use their sovereignty in the specially arranged proper ways in accordance with constitution” (Ates 1996: 14). The one reason behind this restriction is that the ruling class desired to control ‘national will’. This decision was made and fulfilled with the philosophy of the 27 May 1960 military coup. An endeavour to restrict the elected government became a convention through the 1961 constitution.

Though the 1961 Constitution brought liberal provisions on civil liberties, it also brought the senate, the constitutional court, the national security council, the supreme council of the judiciary and the state planning organisation which opened the way to definite changes in the political scene. At the governmental level it signified the dominance of statist Kemalism. As explained earlier the military played a crucial role in the political events prior to the republic (1908 -23). The 1960s strengthened the bureaucracy and represented the re-emergence of the military as a major force. After 1961 the statist groups had acquired considerable influence and wished to achieve the political and ideological supremacy of its own cadres (Karpat 1988: 144).

Turkish politics in the 1960s and 1970s were increasingly ideological. In addition to the fact that the RPP failed to win an overall majority in any of the six general elections since 1950 (Hale 1994: 175), the political parties failed to make coalitions perform effectively and terrorism increased as a means of obtaining political demands in the 1970s. Moreover, the student political activism which had started at the end of the Democrat Party governments, intensified due to the influence of the international 1968 youth movement. The revolutionary Marxist organisations and their oppositions were created in the 1960s and grew in number and size as well.

On the other hand, urban problems in Turkey reached their peak during the 1970s when the municipal elections in major urban centres like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir were won by the left-of-centre Republican People's Party candidates. Therefore, the centre-right coalitions in question tightened their tutelage over the municipalities which were in the rival hands.

Though the exact reason is still not clear (Hale 1994: 185), it could be said that the large scale domestic turmoil forced the armed forces to intervene once again in March 1971. At that time, "their action was far less decisive and complete" (Hale 1994: 184), and they did not come to power directly, but permitted the establishment of a non-partisan cabinet to impose martial law (Brown 1981: 389). On the other hand, the 1971 military coup established the State Security Courts in 1973 to deal with charges against the existence of the Turkish state (Hale 1977(a)).

The 12 September 1980 military coup was different from its predecessors in terms of its success, length and character which was more homogeneous, and had conservative objectives (Hale 1994: 246). However, the main characteristics of the three coups were

that: firstly, they imbued themselves with guardianship responsibilities for the political system and the state; secondly, they came to power reluctantly and never wanted to stay there for a long time; thirdly, they had the Kemalist ideology and accepted the principle of multi-party politics and democracy, though they tended to emphasise a disciplined form of democracy. The intention of the military leaders was both to resurrect the state as the anchor of Turkish society and to restore democracy (Erguder 1988: 22). However, some authors like Mustafa Erdogan (Erdogan 1998: 329-42) questioned this assertion and implied the opposite.

In terms of the position of the military and the military's guidance over Turkish politics appointed military bureaucrats are usually more powerful than the politicians who are elected by the Turkish people. As Sakallioğlu states, the Turkish civilian regime has been unable to control the military and the Turkish military enjoys a strong degree of military autonomy in three dimensions: institutional, ideological and behavioural (Sakallioğlu 1997: 151-2). In the next section, the Turkish liberal tradition which has grown indirectly, under the influence of the modernisation process, will be explained. In the conclusion, the main conditions of the reconciliation and its implications will be briefly summarised.

The Liberal Tendency in Turkish Politics

As the previous section clearly stated, the Turkish modernisation process did not take place within a framework of liberalism. However, liberalism has had a very important significance and influence in Turkish politics especially the early and late period of Turkish modernisation.

The main objective of this section is to provide an overview of the neo-liberal tendency in Turkish politics until the 1980s, especially in the 1970s. This section will explore the historical background of liberal

political and economic policies, including during the Ottoman Empire.

Historical And Cultural Background

Wild Flower In Homeland? The Ottoman Period (1719-1923)

Though liberalism as an ideology goes back to the seventeenth century in the West, Turkey did not experience liberalism as a single tradition in the Western sense until the second part of the twentieth century. In the political and economic sense, liberalism has been an ideology of the bourgeoisie; it was both a challenge to arbitrary power and a pursuit of individual-interest in the West. In Turkey the liberal conception had an abstract meaning until the 1980s. Liberalism had never been an ideology of class struggles in Turkey. However, some aspects of liberal thought arrived in the Ottoman Empire under the name of 'innovations, regulations and reforms'.

The great French Revolution of 1789 made its important mark on the Ottoman state in terms of bringing about change. The Ottoman Empire which was multi national in character suffered from the *nationalist* perspective of the 1789 Revolution. Therefore, the ruling class, especially the sultan of the era, Selim III realised that change was inevitable for the Empire. It was the era in which some Western liberal ideas began to enter the empire and to influence it.

However, it must be noted that the fundamental motivation behind the change was military more than political and social. Since Ottoman armies suffered from a series of defeats at the hands of their European adversaries, the rulers of the empire were obliged to change and modernise the equipment and training of their armies. It was during this reform period that the Ottomans became acquainted with liberal thought. Therefore, the Ottoman meeting with Western liberal ideas took place in an

indirect way. Liberal ideas penetrated the empire under the name of "reform" or "innovation" or, using the expressions of those days "*Tanzimat*"(regulations), "*Islahat*" (reforms) (Mardin 1992: 11).

Although some disciplinary measures were taken in terms of administration, Selim III was able to carry out only the military reforms. He created a voluntary army, trained and equipped on European lines, the Army of the New Order (*Nizami Cedit Ordusu*) more loyal to himself, because the Janissaries had lost their combat effectiveness. To finance this army, a special new treasury (*Iradi Cedit Hazinesi*) was set up. In terms of international relations, permanent Ottoman embassies were established in the major European capitals such as London, Paris, Vienna and Berlin. These Ottoman embassies served as channels of transmission through which Western ideas had access to the empire. During the reign of Sultan Selim III, the old and new institutions co-existed.

Mahmud II embarked on an important programme of reforms; he drew up the main lines along which later Tanzimat reformers were to follow, although his objective was to increase centralisation (Turkone 1995: 7). These reform measures acted as a prelude to the Tanzimat which was the core of the Turkish modernisation process, and hence the liberal process. The Bond of Alliance (*Sened-i Ittifak*) which was signed between the Sultanate and local notables, was recorded as the first Ottoman document which restricted the sultans' authority.

Again the most important part of the reform program was concentrated on the military side. Mahmud II eventually abolished the Janissaries on the 15th of June 1826, and set up a new army, *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye* (the Victorious Soldiers of Muhammed). He also adopted new measures for the improvement of the military; new clothes and the shaving of

beards (Karpat 1959: 8-9). A Military College, a significant institution which played an important role in Turkish political life at the end of the Ottoman Empire, was established.

Mahmud II intended to create a modern cabinet government. He started to transform his advisory and administrative chambers into a modern Council of Ministers. A Grand Vezir became a Prime Minister and a coordinator of the activities of the government. Some ministries took new names and some of them were newly created. The Council of Ministers (*Meclis-Vukela*) was created under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.

The structure of a complex Ottoman bureaucratic hierarchy was established on modern lines during this period. For the first time in Ottoman history the civil servants were divided into two separate departments as domestic and foreign affairs. They were categorised in accordance with their duties. A regular salary system was introduced and they started to receive monthly salaries from the state.

In 1838, the Sultan Mahmud established a series of new advisory councils in accordance with his other reforms. They were named as *Dar-i Sura-yi Askeri* (Centre of Council of Military) and *Meclis-i Vala-yi Ahkam-i Adliye* (Council of Judicial Judgements). This second one gave rise to the emergence of the Council of State and Supreme Court of Appeal which are the main judicial bodies of the principal of the separation of powers.

Another institution that became one of the sources of intellectual life of the Tanzimat was the *Tercume Odasi* (Translation Office). Following the Greek Revolution in 1821, it was established to handle translation duties and to train young Ottomans to replace the Greeks who had traditionally performed this function. It became a major source not only of diplomats and educated bureaucrats but

also of the new intelligentsia who were going to be the creators of the Tanzimat such as Sadik Rifat Pasha, Ali Pasha and Fuat Pasha. They were advocates of liberal thought and were brought up in this office.

3 November 1839 represented a cornerstone in Turkish history and indicated the beginning of the Regulations (*Tanzimat*) period. The Imperial Decree of the Regulations, which was conceived and written by Mustafa Resid Pasha with the consent of Sultan Abdulmecit (1839-1861) as 'ordinance imperial' was announced on this day in Gulhane Square in Istanbul. Serif Mardin claims that this period was influenced by western cameralism⁶ (Mardin 1992: 12).

The principles of the Tanzimat reforms were set up by this decree and they paved the way for a constitutional state in Turkey for the first time in its history. According to Cemil Meric, a prominent modern thinker in Turkey, the Tanzimat represented a 'desperation era' in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans not only gave up their superiority over Europe, but they also became first 'daunted', and later 'surrendered' psychologically (Alkan 1993: 105).

The decree of 18 February 1856 (*Islahat Fermani*) put the Ottoman citizens' life, property and honour inviolably under the state's guarantee. It also called for certain improvements in the financial, military and judiciary fields. Most importantly it did not make any distinction among Ottoman subjects. It was announced that all the liberal principles were going to apply to all Ottoman citizens equally, whether Muslims or non Muslims.

With the Imperial Decree of reforms in 1856 and the Land Code, the right of private ownership was enhanced and took on clear legal form. With the proclamation of the Tanzimat Decree, Confiscation and Escheat systems that prevented capital accumulation

within the empire were abolished⁷. The central and local advisory councils of the Tanzimat period, especially the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinance (*Meclis-i Vala-yi Ahkami Adliye*) served to spread liberalism in the empire (Seyitdanlioglu 1996: 108).

In order to encourage trade the bureaucrats who advocated the Tanzimat opened the first bank (*Osmanli Bankasi*) in the Ottoman state in 1863. They supported the establishment of a private ferry enterprise in the Bosphorus named Auspicious Enterprise (*Sirket-i Hayriye*). The enterprise was established in 1850. The idea came from Fuad Pasha and Ahmet Cevdet Pasha. It was a private company with two hundred share certificates. In addition to prominent bureaucrats and aristocrats the Sultan and his mother had a share. It was a private company in essence, but its establishment arose under the state's supervision. It was effectively state-controlled, though technically it was not a state-owned company. The company became a symbol of private enterprise in the Ottoman state (Cavdar 1992: 39).

Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that all these improvements did not take place for the sake of liberalism or in the boundaries of liberal ideology although there were some prominent advocates of liberalism such as Sadik Rifat Pasha and Cavit Pasha in the Ottoman state. They, however, were only individuals and did not represent any sophisticated liberal movement. At the same time these reforms were top-down. They took place because:

(a) the Empire was in a desperate situation and needed to improve its position,

(b) the administrative cadre who were in charge of these measures were heavily influenced by the West. They felt that the Ottoman Empire was multi-national in character and they risked the integrity of the empire by imposing the individualist

character of liberalism. The Ottoman statesmen were seeking remedies to keep all elements of the Empire together. (Seyitdanlioglu 1996: 106-7).

In terms of political liberalism, the Tanzimat era had a positive affect although it was initiated to strength the state. Nevertheless, the Tanzimat was accused of being responsible for the under-representation of Muslim Turks in the business community. According to Bugra, "it was during the Tanzimat era that the Muslim population of the empire began to leave the realm of business" (Bugra 1994: 37). The main reason behind this is that the establishment of modern bureaucracy provided jobs attractive to the Muslims.

Economic thought began to improve within the empire after the second half of the nineteenth century. Many of the Ottoman intellectuals believed that a liberal economy was the only solution for the economic development of the state. In terms of economics, Sakizli Ohannes Pasha (Greek), who was a lecturer in the School of State (*Mekteb-i Mulkiye*), wrote books which favoured classical liberalism⁸. The Finance minister Cavit Bey also advocated liberal economy. These two published their articles in the Magazine of Sciences (*Mecmua-i Funun*) which acted as an encyclopaedia to bring new scientific innovations into the Empire.

The new ideas, which the Tanzimat brought up, paved the way for the constitutional parliament. Immediately after the Tanzimat, the first constitutional period (*Birinci Mesrutiyet*) was announced on 23 December 1876. This was considered a key date in the modernisation of Turkey by Mardin (Mardin 1988: 26), lasting two years until 1878. Undoubtedly, this announcement was a direct result of the Tanzimat.

The first Ottoman Constitution (*Kanun-i Esasi*) was promulgated in 1876, by virtue of

the opposition of the Young Ottomans and effort of Midhat Pasha. Thus, though “it was an established custom for the Ottoman government to convene an assembly of leading civilian, military and religious officials to discuss important matters of policy” (Ozbudun 1988: 5), the Turks got their first constitution and parliament in 1876. “The constitution of 1876 granted in writing, certain individual rights to the citizens, and also established a Parliament composed of a House of Deputies and a Senate” (Karpas 1959: 13). It provided, for the first time, some constitutional mechanism to check the absolute powers of the Sultan, although the Sultan had the supremacy over the Legislature which he could convene and dissolve at any time.

However, Sultan Abdulhamid II closed the Members Assembly and suspended the Constitution itself on 14th February 1878 and this continued until the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Until then it was claimed that the constitution was still in force. Abdulhamid’s suspension of the chamber did not create any strong public reaction. Moreover, his absolutist rule, giving the Khilafet mission⁹ to the state was quite popular with the anti-Western mood of public opinion (Ozbudun 1988: 7). However, Mardin claims that during this period, western ideas were well understood (Mardin 1992: 15).

This authoritarian period of Abdulhamid II gave rise to the emergence of the (Jon) Young Turks Associations. They were constitutionalists and against the monarchic autocracy. Their main purpose was to limit the powers of the Sultan and reinforce the Constitution of 1876 (Karpas 1959: 12). The Young Turks movement endeavoured to end the absolutism of Abdulhamid II and stimulate public awareness and consciousness about freedom. Its members lived mainly in the West, especially in

France. They were generally all well educated.

The members of the Young Turks movement organised two congresses, the first on 4-9 February 1902 and the second in 1907. After the discussions of these two congresses they divided and pursued two different courses. The first was the positivist and centralist Society for Union and Progress (*Ittihad and Terakki*). Their character and methods were also accepted by the Republican People’s Party. The second, was the liberal, revolutionary Society of Private Initiative and De-centralisation (*Tesebbusi Sahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti*) (Reyhan 1993: 121). “The convention split, partly on personality conflicts but mainly on the question of whether or not the army and foreign assistance should be used in the contemplated internal revolution” (Karpas 1959: 14).

The first tradition was centralist, against international interventions, reformist and communalist. It desired the creation of a national bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the second tradition was de-centralist, revolutionary and individualistic in character. Though the second tradition also shared the objective of the creation of national bourgeoisie they did not exaggerate this desire and relied on the emerging bourgeoisie and minorities. This movement turned itself into a political party before the republic. It became the *Ahrar* Party (Reyhan 1993: 122). It can be claimed that this division continued during the Republic. The Republican People’s Party represented the Union and Progress party, while the *Ahrar* Party was represented by different rightist parties such as the Democrat Party and the Motherland Party.

Written and verbal opposition of the Young Turks within the empire and abroad gave rise to the declaration of the second Ottoman Constitution (*Ikinci Mesrutiyet*) in

1908. The second constitutional period (*İkinci Mesrutiyet*) (1908-1918) formed the most important part of the latest period of the Ottoman Empire. The *İttihad and Terakki* (Society for Union and Progress) transformed itself into a political party. During that time the Empire's destiny was in the hands of İttihad and Terakki. Though this period gave rise to the emergence of organised party politics, it was characterised by a degenerate period of coups, counter-coups, political assassinations, martial law courts, manipulation of elections, repression of opposition, in short outright party dictatorship. The *İttihad and Terakki* politics were 'issue-oriented politics' with the modernising, unifying, centralising, standardising, nationalist, authoritarian and statist character (Ozbudun 1988: 9).

The second *Mesrutiyet* represents one of the most politically active periods of Turkish politics. At that time, the opposition parties such as the Moderate Liberals (*Mutedil Hurriyetperveran*), the Ottoman Radical Reform (*Islahati Esasiyeyi Osmaniye*), the Peoples Party (*Ahali Partisi*), the Party of Islamic Unity (*İttihadi Muhammedi*), mushroomed with dissidents from the İttihad and Terakki. The minority groups came together to form the Freedom and Union (*Hurriyet ve İtilaf*). On the other hand, there was a terrorist revolutionary group, the Saviour Officers' Group (*Halaskar Zabitan Grubu*) formed by army officers. This group was able to oust the Union and Progress from power for a short time in 1912 (Karpas 1959: 17).

Prince Sebahaddin was a prominent liberal thinker who deserve to be mentioned separately in this section. He was an Ottoman prince who joined the Young Turks movement. Prince Sabahattin foresaw a fundamental transformation of the Ottoman Empire by de-centralising the administration and promoting individual initiative and by

encouraging the intelligentsia to engage in productive occupations rather than seek government jobs (Karpas 1959: 19). He favoured the Western type of education and gave priority to notions of individualism. He thought it necessary for the Ottoman Empire to develop on individual-based capacities (Baydur 1993: 41).

Prince Sabahattin should not be considered as a sophisticated liberal thinker. He considered society as a dynamic entity and wanted to design it for the sake of improvement. On the other hand, his "ideas were in a way too premature to be applied to a society in which the fundamental question of its political regime had not been decided and the actual force of socio-economic factors had yet not been understood" (Karpas 1959: 19). The most significant side of him was that he favoured individual enterprise, decentralisation and distribution of accountability.

The four years between 1914 and 1918 of the second constitutional period represented a return from the so-called liberal era. During that time the İttihad ve Terakki inclined towards national economy politics. This was as a result of the first World War when, over one third of the Ottoman territories were lost. In the first World War 'the Sick man'¹⁰, the Ottoman Empire, to all intents and purposes died, though in theory it continued during the National Independence years (1918-1922).

As a result of the occupation, the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved on 18 March 1920. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the nationalist forces in Anatolia demanded the election of a new parliament 'with extraordinary powers'. The Grand National Assembly was convened in Ankara. This assembly was very powerful, because it combined legislative and executive powers in itself. The assembly could give instructions to the ministers and replace them.

The Grand National Assembly prepared the shortest constitution in Turkish history in 1921. Though it lasted only a short time, “in the entire Turkish history, the political influence of the legislature reached its peak during the period of national liberation. The theory of legislative supremacy was also followed in practice. The Assembly closely supervised all aspects of administrative activity. Under the most difficult external and internal circumstances, Kemal and his ministers ruled the country in close co-operation” (Ozbudun 1988: 10).

After the victory over the invaders (mainly, Greeks, French and Italians) in the Independence War, the sultanate was abolished in the autumn of 1922 and on 29th October 1923 the new Republic was acclaimed. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk formed a political party, the Republican People's Party. In the 1923 elections it won almost all of the assembly seats.

Consequently, the nineteenth century experienced a modernisation process, in other words, a Westernisation process. Though this modernisation process aimed at immediate practical ends and was charted by practical conditions rather than by a well-defined ideology, this century was very important in terms of liberalism: not only for the reforms but also for the theoretical dimension. Although the modernisation process started as a ‘defence device’ in the days of the Ottoman Empire, Westernisation later became the primary goal in itself. This was formulated as a process of ‘catching up with the level of contemporary civilisation’.

The Republican Era

The establishment of the Republic represents a turning point in terms of liberalism, because of the close relationship between Westernisation and liberalism, though the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, headed an authoritarian strand which stemmed from the Ittihad Terakki

tradition. The announcement of the Republic and the Grand National Assembly itself were fundamental and pre-eminent reforms which created a framework of political and legal legitimacy for every effort towards reaching ‘the level of contemporary civilisation’ (*cagdas uygarlik duzeyi*). The Grand National Assembly enacted a constitution in 1921. This was a short, but very important document. For the first time it proclaimed the principle of ‘national sovereignty’ calling itself the ‘only and true representative of the nation’.

Ataturk offered a new target for Turkey which the West had already experienced. The two major reforms, the establishment of the republic and the abolition of the Caliphate, represented a basic departure from the oriental background and indicated a definite reorientation towards modernism, that is, a new cultural-political philosophy differing from the religious foundations and previous political structure. Thus, Mustafa Kemal's initial reforms have provided the basis for contemporary legitimacy. Without them, Turkey might have been still struggling to terminate its totalitarianism as many Middle Eastern countries are still doing today.

The rightist politicians and intellectuals mostly share the common idea that the liberal movement existed as a political and economic current in Turkish politics until the Ozal period, although its strength changed from time to time. This view was also elaborated in interviews, for example an interview with the former Industrialisation minister Sukru Yurur (Interview, 11 June 1996). This explanation certainly seems plausible and has provided a framework for this section. However, this process has not been a constant step-by-step building process.

Since the political character of the Ataturkian era had a clear statist character which has been explained in detail in the first

section, only two politically liberal examples will be picked up and discussed here. The first liberal political movement emerged in November 1924. Twenty nine deputies of the People's Party resigned from their party and formed a new party called the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiyer Cumhuriyet Firkası*). This party was led by a number of prestigious former generals who fought with Ataturk during the war of Independence.

The Progressive Republican Party favoured the idea of the concentration of all powers in the National Assembly. "In its initial manifesto the party emphasised economic and particularly political liberalism, including a commitment to 'respect religious feelings and beliefs'. The manifesto stated its opposition to despotism, and stressed individual rights, judicial independence and administrative decentralisation" (Ozbudun 1988: 11). They reflected their concerns about Ataturk's growing personal power. Therefore its goal was to strive to preserve individual freedom by "opposing the despotic tendencies of a few people and their oligarchic aims" (Karpas 1959: 46).

Its foundation created some concerns in the government, and the Progressive Republican party did not last long and was eventually outlawed on 3 June 1925 by a decision of the Council of Ministers. They were accused of taking part in the Seyh Said (Kurdish-religious) rebellion that erupted in February 1925 and this was justification for shutting down the party. The *Takrirî Sukun* (Maintenance of Order Law) was promulgated on March 4, 1925, thus, Martial Law was declared and the government was granted broad powers to ban all kinds of organisation, propaganda and publication that could lead to reaction and rebellion against Turkish public order and security. Consequently its leaders were banned from the National Assembly.

The radical reforms and the economic stagnation between 1922 and 1930 created antagonism and discontent in the country. The ruling elite was aware of growing discontent and decided to divert opposition within the populace, by setting up a loyal party to provide an opposition. The Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkası*) came about as the result of these circumstances. "The purpose in establishing this party was to air the accumulated discontent and provide some control over the government both to correct its shortcomings, and to stimulate it to seek new ways of coping with the economic situation" (Karpas 1959: 65).

Fethi Okyar, a close friend of Kemal established the Free Republican Party on August 12, 1930. Though its main policy consisted of opposing the Republican Party, the Free Party had general principles of liberal tendency such as free enterprise, abolition of monopolies and free speech. The party did not survive too long, existing only for ninety-nine days before it was banned on November 17, 1930. Its supporters comprised of small merchants, urban petty bourgeoisie and commercial farmers, which were the same groups that formed the DP in 1950. This movement also expressed the people's resentment towards the radical secularism of the government (Keyder 1987: 124-5).

The Free Party was placed in the position of opposing the regime and Mustafa Kemal. Therefore, the Free Party leaders decided to dissolve their party. Its abolition was justified by the need to protect the regime against counter-revolutionaries.

It must be noted that "whenever Mustafa Kemal made efforts to establish 'loyal' opposition, it was the problem of Islam which kept returning to haunt the reformers" (Yalman 1973: 155). This also applied to the 1950 elections, although the construction of

the Democrat Party could not be considered as a 'loyal' opposition.

As a general pattern, after liberal challenges, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes tend to increase their pressure on the social and political agendas. This general tendency of authoritarian regimes proved to be true in the Turkish case and the country was ruled by a single party regime between 1925 and 1945 after this unsuccessful attempt.¹¹ The government established effective control over the entire country by breaking the authority of landlords and religious leaders, and the Republican Party secured control of the Assembly and became the initiator of reforms.

On the other hand, the one party rule attempted to continue its particular way of administration, even after they left power through manipulating the civil and military bureaucracy. Even though the introduction of a continuing authoritarian regime was not intended¹², the RPP left the statist polity behind as a legacy. Though the RPP was in opposition, their statist perspective became an essence of Turkish political regime. Thorough this manipulation, "the Kemalist regime evolved into a single-party model without having a single-party ideology" (Ozbudun 1988: 15). In fact, Kemalism became not only the single party ideology, but also the state ideology itself after the 1960 military coup in Turkish politics.

Diversification of Society: The 1950s

The struggle for a multi-party system in Turkey began in 1946 and brought about a reinterpretation of the Republic's ideology. It had two main goals: firstly it intended to neutralise the ideology and the political means which favoured the establishment and maintenance of one-party ruling. Secondly it attempted to assure the free existence of opposition parties, and to devise an impartial election mechanism to allow the people to

freely express their preference for a specific political party (Karpat 1959: 245).

The Democratic Party came to power with victory in the 14 May 1950 elections. The two goals of the Democratic Party were economic and religious freedom. It brought together urban liberals and religious conservatives and modern sections of the rural population into the political sphere. Though some intellectuals describe the Democrat Party's character as economic and political such as Keyder, Yayla and Erdogan; some of them do not accept it as a force for economic modernisation such as Ozbudun and Karakoyunlu. They state that the main motivator of the DP and its supporters was their opposition to the state officials and the RPP. This movement emerged from the necessity of democracy (Ozbudun 1988: 16). Yilmaz Karakoyunlu¹³ (Interview 20 June 1996) claimed that the decade's liberal character was political rather than socio-economic and that it was not a liberal appraisal of economics or class relations. He stated that the common motivator for the Democrat Party voters was their opposition to one party rule. Karakoyunlu went further stating that the DP manipulated the slogan of the liberal economics as a justification for its opposition.

Nevertheless, many writers think eitherwise. It is claimed that the Democrat Party's program of 1950 stated that "the basis of our economic and financial views, it can be said, is to shrink as much as possible the state sector and to broaden as much as possible the private enterprise sector and to provide it security" (Waterbury 1993: 42). The Turkish bourgeoisie continued to gain some strength until the 1950s. Although it stayed with the RPP and its bureaucratic cadre during the Free Party experience, the upper middle class broke up its alliance with both the RPP and bureaucracy and chose to ride the mobilisation of the masses, since it

had full confidence and expectation in the coming boom in the 1950 elections (Keyder 1987: 123-4).

In spite of the opposition it should be stated that in the 1950s, free market tendency became apparent in the government. Obviously international factors also helped the DP. The free world was victorious in World War II. Turkey also started to receive American aid. Diversities which were an present in the society, started to come out and coalesced with the entrepreneurship to create the DP experience. It was the revolt of the periphery against the centre, it did not have anything to do with Islamic revivalism (Tapper 1993: 9). This led to some kind of civil construction in the society.

On the other hand, mostly due to the Islamic opposition, "the politics of Turkey gave the impression to the unsatisfied reformists on the left, who felt that 'liberty' had been restored far too early, that the great reformist task had been left incomplete" (Yalman 1973: 155). Later, that impression paved the way for the 1960 military coup.

During the 1950s, Turkey experienced considerable population mobility. Between 1950 and 1960 the population of the four largest cities increased by 75 per cent and the urban population rose from 19 per cent to 26 per cent. "In other words, one out of every ten villagers emigrated to an urban area during the 1950s" (Keyder 1987: 137). It had two principal affects on Turkey. Firstly, it gave a rise to the development of a manufacturing bourgeoisie. Secondly, it cracked so-called Turkish social unity allowing diversity to become apparent. This process could be considered a healthy sign of a liberal and democratic society.

By stating that Westernisation-modernisation movements have influenced Turkish political history directly, Nilufer Gole makes a sociological classification and

claims that there had never been any state-society relations except, Westernisation-modernisation movements, since the Tanzimat until the 1950s. Although the modernisation process was directed by the elite until the 1950s, the 1950s indicates the beginning of the period in which society put its weight behind the modernisation process, and the development of a civil society. (Gole 1997: 17).

The Decade of the First Military Coup: The 1960s

The 1960 military coup represented a victory for the bureaucracy over social diversity. The constitution of 1961 was prepared and adopted by the Constituent Assembly and finally came into force after being ratified by popular vote on July 9, 1961. In many aspects, the 1961 constitution represented a reaction to the severe problems observed in the functioning of the 1924 constitution. Whilst the 1961 constitution tried to restrict 'people's sovereignty', it also expanded civil liberties and granted extensive social rights. The 1961 constitution supplied plenty of individual and social liberties.

According to Mustafa Erdogan (Interview, 25 June 1996) the elitist bureaucratic and intellectual members of the Representative Assembly endeavoured to supply these liberties for themselves. They were not segregationists in essence, but they did not expect the opposition to use these rights effectively enough, because the opposition was neither very well educated nor well organised. However, these liberties were also beneficial for the opposition and the passive masses of the society, in that, these liberties improved their position and allowed them to form themselves into organisations.

Due to the increasing acts of political violence by extremist youth groups, the 12 March 1970 military memorandum was given to the ruling party, the Justice party. Immediately after the military memorandum, the leader of the Justice party, prime minister

Demirel resigned. They did not dissolve the parliament and preferred a technocratic government under Professor Nihat Erim. This government was expected to end political violence with the help of martial law, to accomplish certain constitutional amendments designed to strengthen the executive and to carry out the social reforms provided for by the 1961 constitution (Ozbudun 1988: 20).

The government was not able to carry out social reforms, but it stopped the political violence and also revised the constitution in 1971 and 1973. It curtailed individual and social rights and freedoms which were guaranteed under the 1961 constitution. It aimed not only to strengthen the executive authority, but also to prune certain individual liberties that were considered responsible for the emergence of political extremism and violence.

Political Violence, Coalitions and Chaos: the 1970s

Immediately after the coup of 1971, the RPP emerged as the largest party in the 1973 elections. On the other hand, the right was badly split and the composition of the 1973 National Assembly required coalition governments. The 1977 elections did not signify any change and Turkey had three coalition governments and resignations, one minority government and one illusionist government that only became possible as it was filled with people who had resigned from the Justice Party in eight years (Hale 1977(b))¹⁴. Moreover, the political violence and terrorism continued to grow and spiralled out of control.

If the republican era is closely examined, it is obvious that there has been a very close connection between the religious or conservative demands and liberal movements. Three liberal examples of the political movement (the Progressive RP, the FRP and the DP) raised some religious demands and rights along with their (real or pseudo) liberal manifestos.

The Coup d'etat, the 1980s as the New Era:

In spite of the military coup on the 12 September 1980, the 1980s represented the rise of neo-liberalism in Turkey. After the introduction of economic measures in January 1980, the 1980s experienced neo-liberal policies, mainly economic ones. However, these policies also had political and social dimensions and aspirations which were explained either by the generals or by the politicians, especially Turgut Ozal.

Republican nationalism and secularism did not pose any serious threat to the economic policies of the Ozal governments. However, in terms of political and constitutional changes, the Ozal governments faced important resistance from the statist cadres, rather than from the masses. Necessary changes could not be realised in Turkey, thus, neo-Liberal ideas and their effectiveness were blunted. Though new right ideas influenced the attitudes and beliefs of the Turkish people and the political culture, this influence could not be represented at the centre, due to the statist resistance. This resistance has since grown, during the 1990s.

Conclusions

In Turkey the existing system and dominant values were determined and defined by the state and the existing bureaucratic system although they were a consequence of the constant struggle of an aristocracy and bourgeoisie against the monarchy in the west. The Kemalist statism is a consolidation of bureaucratic sovereignty, especially the military bureaucracy. Since the upper structure did not take shape as a consequence of social and economic mobilisation in Turkey, the Turkish political tradition does not have the notion of "restricted state" which has performed as a legitimacy power (Sakallioğlu 1994: 20-26). The state, then, exists in two dimensions in Turkey: in one, it is visible, official, obedient to rules; in the

other, it is obscure, hidden from public view, guided by a changing balance of forces that only initiates can properly discern.

Although the former was dominant, the statist and liberal traditions intertwined each other in the Turkish modernisation process. They were two faces of the process. The modernisation process and its liberal consequences have been from the top down and the periphery in Turkish society could not take a precise initiative. Though it can be argued that while the emergence of an independent civil society and the development of liberalism are very important, they have been restricted by the dominance of the state. It has created a dilemma for civil forces. While they have intended to restrict state dominance, they have had to operate at the state level to become successful. The centre has never allow the periphery to dominate itself. However, if Turkey uses its chance this strong statist tradition might be a chance for Turkish democracy, because this tradition can supply a 'working state' (Dodd 1990: 139).

Although the second section of this article explains what Turkey experienced in terms of liberalism, it has always faced the dominant reality of Turkish politics which has been statist in character. We should not forget that there was no well-constructed, independent and unique liberal movement up to the 1980s in Turkey.

However, the advent of liberal ideas is not a new and rootless development in Turkey as many scholars think today. In fact, the first advent of liberal ideas in Turkey goes back as far as the first quarter of the eighteenth century and liberal ideas have been considered to be synonymous with the terms of 'reform' and 'modernisation' for a long time.

Including the Ozal period, the history of liberalism in Turkey developed under the very tense shadow of international conditions, which made it lack legitimacy in

the eyes of many Turkish people. Liberalism did not develop as a class movement which was separate from the dominant institutions in Turkey. This impediment does not mean that liberalism will never flourish in Turkey, but it highlights the difficulties facing liberal reformers. The question is, in the Turkish case, whether Turkey should experience the late modernity, which the West experienced a century ago. In the Turkish case the lack of a liberal movement can be attributed to the lack of philosophical perspective.

Since Ozal lost power, Turkey's stance in terms of liberalism has changed and continues to deteriorate. The main reason behind this is that whenever the economy becomes the main concern of Turkish politics, as it was during the Ozal period, statism tended to lose its hold. Whenever the principles of security, integrity and secularism become the main concerns of Turkish politics, statism dominates the country immediately. This was valid before Ozal came to power in 1980, but is still valid in the 1990s.

ENDNOTES

1. Liberal Turkish academician in Gazi University, Ankara, Turkey.
2. One of the four sects of the *Sunni* Islam to which the overwhelming majority of the Turks belong.
3. An Islamic concept of all Muslims.
4. The *Young Turks* were the constitutionalists who opposed the monarchic autocracy which emerged during the first Ottoman Parliament between 1876 and 1978.
5. *Laicism* differs from *secularism*. Though the latter stands for an exact separation of religion and state, the former tends to keep religion in its grip. (Hocaoglu, 1994)
6. An administrative movement in the West to sweep away the remnants of autocracy and feudalism.
7. Under the Ottoman fief system, the fief's lands could be taken either from him or from his peasants, if they misused their rights or did not have any child to hand down.

8. The name of one of his books was even synonymous with Adam Smith's famous book *the Wealth of Nations*. Its title was 'an Introduction to Science of the Wealth of Nations'.

9. Although the Ottoman Sultans seized the Khilafet in the early sixteenth century, they did not use it until Abdulhamid II. During the nineteenth century, as the Ottoman decline persisted, Abdulhamid II exerted his position of the Khilafe as a stimulator in order to unite so-called all Islamic nations (*Umma*) against the West.

10. This name was given to the Ottoman Empire by the West in the nineteenth century.

11. It is also true for the cases of the Democrat Party and the Motherland Party experiences.

12. Some authors like Koker oppose this assertion and claim that the RPP intended to create one party authoritarianism (Koker 1990).

13. He is a prominent liberal from Motherland Party (MP).

14. In 1978, the eleven Members of the Parliament from the Justice Party resigned and they joined the Republican People's Party to construct new government. As a result of their deal, all of them were appointed as ministers in the government which was called *illusionist government*.

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Borsanın ülke ekonomisindeki önemli rolünü bir türlü anlayamamakta, yüksek faizler ve yüksek enflasyon üzerindeki etkilerini bir türlü kavrayamamakta, paramızın değeri üzerindeki etkilerini bir türlü algılayamamakta, anlayamamaktayız.

Anlasak da, hep siyasi çıkarlar uğruna, kişisel çıkarlar uğruna göz ardı etmekte, görmezlikten gelmekte ve içerisinde kaybolduğumuz bu "ŞEYTAN ÜÇGENİ"nden bir türlü çıkamamaktayız. O halde, birilerinin ortaya çıkıp sadece, ülkeyi bu Şeytan Üçgeni'nden kurtarmayı, yüksek enflasyondan, ranta muhtaciyetten, yüksek faiz politikalarından kurtarmayı istemesi gerekmektedir. Ama, sadece istemesi...

İnanıyoruz ki, bu da olacak, bu da yapılacaktır günün birinde. Zira, o potansiyel de inanın var bizlerde. Ama ümit ederiz ki, daha fazla geç kalınmasın, daha geç olmasın. Devletçe, toplumca, milletçe tek isteğimiz bu...

Haluk ÇAĞIRMAN

Genel dağıtım ve isteme adresi
Siyasal Kitabevi
Dirim Sk. 23/2 Cebeci-Ankara
Tel: 0 312 320 45 10